If we know the probabilities p1; : : : ; pn of di erent situations s1; : : : ; sn, then we can choose a decision Ai for which the expected bene t Ci = p1 ci1 + : : : + pn cin takes the largest possible value, where cij denotes the bene t of decision Ai in situation sj. In many real life situations, however, we do not know the exact values of the probabilities pj; we only know the intervals pj = p ? j ; p + j ] of possible values of these probabilities. In order to make decisions under such interval probabilities, we would like to generalize the notion of expected bene ts to interval probabilities. In this paper, we show that natural requirements lead to a unique (and easily computable) generalization. Thus, we have a natural way of decision making under interval probabilities.
Introduction to the Problem
Decision making: case of exactly known consequences. One of the main problems in decision making is the problem of choosing one of ( nitely many) alternatives A 1 ; : : :; A m . For example, we may choose one of the possible locations of a new airport, one of the possible designs for a new plant; a farmer needs to choose a crop to grow, etc.
In some situations, we know the exact consequences of each choice; in particular, we know the numerical bene ts (e.g., monetary, utilities, etc.) C 1 ; : : :; C m which characterize the consequences of each choice. In such situations, the choice of the best alternative is easy: we simply choose the alternative A i for which the value C i is the largest C i ! max i :
Decision making: case of exactly known probabilities. Most frequently, however, for each choice A i , the exact value of the bene t related to this choice is not known beforehand, because this value depends not only on our choice, but also on some situation which is beyond our control. For example, the farmer's bene ts depend not only on his choice of a crop, but also on the weather. Usually, in such cases, we can enumerate all possible situations s 1 ; : : :; s n , and for each choice A i and for each situation s j , we know (or at least we can estimate) the value c ij of the bene t that this choice will bring in the situation s j . In such cases, in order to choose the best alternative, it helps to know how probable di erent situations are.
Traditional methods of decision making (see, e.g., 7, 17, 20] ) are based on the assumption that we know the probabilities p 1 ; : : :; p n of di erent situations s j . In this case, we can take the average (expected) bene t C i = p 1 c i1 + : : :+ p n c in as a measure of quality of each alternative A i , and select the alternative for which this expected bene t takes the largest possible value: C i = p 1 c i1 + : : : + p n c in ! max i :
Decision making: a more realistic case of intervally known probabilities. In some situations, we do not know the exact values of the probabilities p i . Instead, we only have the intervals p i = p ? i ; p + i ] of possible values of probabilities (see, e.g., 15, 21, 31] and references therein).
Example: Cassini mission. As a recent example of the necessity of decision making under interval probabilities, we can cite the planning of a Cassini mission to Saturn; the technical discussion of the corresponding decision issues is presented, e.g., in 18] . Since this mission was sent to the far bounds of the Solar System, where the Solar light is very dim, it could not rely solely on Solar batteries (as usual planetary missions), so a plutonium energy source was added. The preference of a reasonable large amount of such highly radioactive substance as plutonium made a possible launch failure a potential serious health risk.
To make a decision, NASA followed the standard decision making paradigm and tried to estimate the probability of this failure. However, researchers soon pointed out (see 18] for more detail) that due to the large uncertainties in the database, we cannot get the exact probabilities, we can, at best, get an interval of possible values of these probabilities. So, instead of using the original numerical estimate e p 1 10 ?6 for the probability of the disaster, the planners should have used the whole interval p 1 0; 10 ?3 ] of possible values of p 1 .
Although acknowledged, this idea was not formally implemented in the planning of the actual mission, mainly due to the lack of the appropriate decision making techniques. Many NASA researchers are willing to take these intervals into consideration when planning future missions.
Averaging: a natural idea. Of course, the interval probabilities p i must be consistent, i.e., there should be values p i 2 p i which form a probability distribution (i.e., for which p 1 + : : : + p n = 1). For each such distribution p = (p 1 ; : : :; p n ), we can compute the expected bene t C i (p) = p 1 c i1 +: : :+p n c in ; the problem is that in the case of interval uncertainty, there are many (actually, in nitely many) possible probability distributions, and di erent distributions lead, in general, to di erent values of the expected bene t. We would like to somehow combine, \average" these values C i (p) and come up with a single numerical estimate of the quality of a given alternative. How can we do that?
In this paper, we show how this \average" can be naturally de ned. Namely, we describe reasonable requirements on this \average" and then show that these conditions uniquely determine an expression for this \average". Luckily for decision making applications, this expression is easy to compute and is, thus, very practical.
Towards a Formalization of the Problem
The desired quality C i of an alternative A i should only depend on the properties of this particular alternative, and it should not depend on what other alternatives are there. So, when computing C i , we must only take in to consideration, for each situation s j , its interval probability p j and the bene ts c ij which corresponds to this situation s j (and we will not need the values c kj for j 6 = i). In view of this comment, we can simplify our notations by dropping the index i (which characterizes the alternative), and denote the bene t corresponding to the situation s j by c j instead of c ij .
In these simpli ed notations, we can re-formulate our problem as follows:
we have a nite sequence of pairs hp j ; c j i; 1 j n, (with consistent probability intervals p j ); and we need to transform this sequence into a single number C. In other words, we must design a function C which takes, as input, an arbitrary consistent nite sequence of pairs hp j ; c j i and which returns a desired estimate C(hp 1 ; c 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i):
There are some natural properties that we expect from this function. 
4. The fourth desired property comes from the following: whatever are the (unknown) actual probabilities p j 2 p j , the bene t cannot be worse than the worst of the possibilities and cannot be better than the best of the possibilities. In other words, the desired value C must always be between minc j and maxc j :
min j c j C(h p 1 ; p 1 ]; c 1 i; : : :; h p n ; p n ]; c n i) max j c j :
5. The fth property is related to the fact that while we have so far considered a single decision process (choosing A i ), we may have two or more independent decisions one after another: The fact that these choices are independent means that for each pair of choices A i and A 0 k , the resulting bene t e c j in situation s j is simply equal to the sum of the two bene ts: the bene t c ij of choosing A i and the bene t c 0 kj of choosing A 0 k . It is natural to require that in such a situation, the expected bene t of the situation s j for the double choice is simply equal to the sum of expected bene ts corresponding to c j and c 0 j . In other words, we require that C(hp 1 ; c 1 + c 0 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c n + c 0 n i) = C(hp 1 ; c 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i) + C(hp 1 ; c 0 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c 0 n i): (5) 6. The sixth property is related to the following fact: When we analyze the possible consequences of our decisions, we try to list all possible situations by imagining all possible combinations of events. Some of these events may be relevant to our decision, some may later turn out to be irrelevant. As a result, we may end up with two di erent situations, say s 1 and s 2 , which result in the exact same bene t value c 1 = c 2 . To simplify computations, it is desirable to combine these two situations into a single one.
If we know the exact probabilities p 1 and p 2 of each of the original situations, then the probability of the combined situation is equal to p 1 + p 2 . If we do not know the exact probability of each situation, i. The bene t of the decision should not change if we simply combine the two actions with identical consequences into one. In other words, we must have: C(hp 1 ; c 1 i; hp 2 ; c 1 i; hp 3 ; c 3 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i) = C(hp 1 + p 2 ; c 1 i; hp 3 ; c 3 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i): (6) 7. Finally, small changes in the probabilities p ? j or p + j or small changes in bene ts c j should not drastically a ect the resulting bene t function C. In other words, we want the function C to be continuous for any given n. Proof: By de nition, a sequence of probability intervals is consistent if and only if 1 can be represented as p 1 + : : :+ p n for some p j 2 p j . According to the above de nition of the sum of intervals, this condition is, in its turn, equivalent to 1 2 p 1 + : : : + p n . From the above result about the sum of the intervals, we know the exact expression for the endpoints of the interval p 1 +: : :+p n , so the fact that 1 belongs to this intervals can expressed by the inequalities given in the formulation of the proposition. The proposition is proven.
De nition 2. By an averaging operation for interval probabilities, we mean a function C that transforms every nite sequence of pairs (hp 1 ; c 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i) with consistent interval probabilities into a real number C(hp 1 ; c 1 i; : : :; hp n ; c n i); which is continuous for any n, and which satis es the conditions (1){(6).
Theorem. There exists exactly one averaging operation with interval probabilities, and this averaging operation has the form C(h p ? 1 ; p + 1 ]; c 1 i; : : :; h p ? n ; p + n ]; c n i) = e p 1 c 1 + : : : + e p n c n ; The proof of the Theorem is given in Appendix 1.
Examples:
If all the interval probabilities coincide, we get e p j = 1=n for all j, so we must choose an alternative A i for which Hurwicz criterion. This approach has been proposed for the situations in which we have no information about the probabilities p j (i.e., in our terms, when p j = 0; 1] for all j).
In other words: for decision making, we want, for each alternative A i , to nd a numerical value C i that would characterize the utility of this alternative; we do not know the exact value of the utility of each alternative A i ; instead, we know a set of possible values of utility fc i1 ; : : :; c in g that characterize the outcome of this action A i in di erent situations; we do not know which of the situations is more probable and which is less probable, and therefore, we do not know which elements of this set are more probable, and which are less probable. Analogy with our situation. We have a similar situation:
for decision making, we want, for each situation s j , to nd a numerical value e p j that would characterize the probability of this situation; we do not know the exact value of the probability of each situation s j ; instead, we know a set of possible values of probability p ? j ; p + j ]; we do not know which elements of this set are more probable, and which are less probable. 
Averaging and maximum entropy approach
Maximum entropy approach. Averaging over all possible distributions is not the only possible approach. Alternatively, instead of considering all possible probability distributions which are consistent with the given interval al probabilities, we can select one probability distribution which is, in some reasonable sense, the most representative, and make decisions based on this \most representative" distribution. One natural way of selecting the \most representative" distribution is the maximum entropy approach (see, e.g., 6, 14] , and references therein; see also 5, 22, 27, 29] ), according to which we select a probability distribution p j for which the entropy S = ? P p j log(p j ) take the largest possible value. This distribution is relatively easy to describe 14]: there exists a value p 0 such that for all j: when p + j p 0 , we take p j = p + j ; when p 0 p ? j , we take p j = p ? j ; when p ? j p 0 p + j , we take p j = p 0 . This value p 0 can be computed by a quadratic-time (i.e., quite feasible) algorithm 14]. In particular, if all the interval probabilities coincide, then p 1 = : : : = p n = p 0 = 1=n.
In general, these two approaches lead to di erent results. In the above example, our \averaging" approach leads to the same value as the maximum entropy approach. However, in general, the resulting bene t p 1 c 1 +: : :+p n c n is, di erent from the one produced by averaging. As an example of this di erence, let us consider the case when we have two possible situations: a situation s 1 with a small interval probability p 1 Comment. Informally, the di erence between the two approaches can be explained as follows. When all the interval probabilities coincide, both approaches return the same values of equal probabilities e p j = 1=n. In other words, informally, both approaches try to get the probabilities as close to be equal as possible. In this, both approaches agree; the di erence is in how these two approaches interpret the word \close": the maximum entropy approach uses a non-linear expression (entropy) to describe this \closeness", while in the averaging approach, we only consider expressions which are linear in p j .
Which approach is better? Which of the two approaches is better: maximum entropy or averaging? On a general methodological level:
there are arguments in favor of the maximum entropy approach (see, e.g., 6, 14]), but there are also arguments in favor of our averaging: e.g., unlike the maximum entropy approach, our \averaging" solution takes into consideration not just a single distribution, but all probability distributions consistent with the given interval probabilities.
From the practical viewpoint, which of these approaches is better depends on the objective that we want to achieve in a practical problem. For example, if the rst situation s 1 leads to negative consequences, then the maximum entropy approach means that we consider the worst-case (pessimistic) scenario by assuming the worst possible probability of this negative situation, while the averaging approach takes a reasonable mid-point of the interval. So: if our objective is to avoid the worst-case scenario at any cost, we should use maximum entropy method; on the other hand, if s 1 is a reasonable risk, then averaging seems to be more reasonable.
4.3 What if, in addition to interval probabilities p i , we also know the probabilities of di erent values within the intervals p i ?
Description of the problem and the resulting formula. In the above text, we assumed that the only information that we have about the (unknown) probabilities p j is that each of these probabilities belong to the corresponding interval p j = p ? j ; p + j ]. In some cases, however, the estimates p ? j and p + j themselves come from a statistical analysis of the existing records. In this case, in addition to intervals p i , we may also know the probabilities of di erent values within the intervals p i .
For example, we can simply look at all recorded situations, and count how many of them were situations s j . If out of N total records, the situation s j occured in N j of them, then we can take the frequency f j = N j =N as a natural estimate for the probability p j (for details on statistical methods, see any statistical textbook, e.g., 30]).
When the total number of records (N) is large, the error of this estimation, i.e., the di erence f j ? p j between the frequency and the actual probability, is negligible small. However, in many real-life cases, N is not too large, so this di erence is not negligible. It is known in statistics that the probability distribution for this di erence f j ? p j is approximately Gaussian (and the larger N, the closer this distribution to Gaussian), with 0 average and known standard deviation j . So, the desired probability p j = f j ? (f j ? p j ) is distributed according to the Gaussian distribution with the average f j and standard deviation j . Di erent estimation errors f j ?p j are independent random variables, so the random variables p j , p k , j 6 = k are independent too.
How is this information related to intervals? In practically applications of statistics, if we assume a Gaussian probability distribution with average m and standard deviation , and we observe a value x which is farther than k from m (for some xed k), we conclude that the distribution was wrong.
For example, if we test a sensor with the supposed standard deviation = 0:1, and as a result of the testing, we get an error x ? m = 1:0, then it's is natural to conclude (for all k < 10) that the sensor is malfunctioning. Of course, for every k, there is a non-zero probability that the random variable x attains a value outside the interval m ? k ; m + k ], but for large k, this probability is very small. In practical applications, people normally use k = 2 (for which the probability of error outside the interval is 5%), k = 3 (for which the probability of error outside the interval is 0:1%), and, in VLSI design and other important computer engineering applications, k = 6 (for which the probability of error outside the interval is 10 ?6 %). So, if we x a value k (=2, 3, or 6 p j becomes a standard probability problem: namely, as e p j , we take the conditional expectation of p j under the condition that the sum of all the probabilities is 1, i.e., We can now use the standard techniques of multi-dimensional Gaussian distributions to calculate this conditional expectation. Detailed derivation is given in Appendix 2; here we just present the result: (6) p i and e p j must be equal too. 5. We want to prove that the transformation T is described by the formula (8) for all intervals p j . To prove it, let us rst start by showing that this is true for intervals p j = p ? j ; p + j ] with rational endpoints.
Since all the endpoints are rational, we can reduce them to a common denominator. Let us denote this common denominator by N; then each of the endpoints p ? j and p + j has the form m=N for a non-negative integer m. Let us de- What is the result of applying T to this long list? This long list contains intervals of two types, and intervals of each type are identical. We have already proven in part 4 of this proof that if two intervals from the list are equal, then the corresponding values of e p j are equal too. Thus: the transformation T maps all degenerate intervals 1=N; 1=N] into one and the same value; we will denote this value by ; similarly, the transformation T maps all non-degenerate intervals 0; 1=N] into one and the same value; we will denote this value by . So, we get the mapping To determine these parameters, we will also use the additivity property (6 0 ). Namely, from (12) 
On the other hand, from (2 0 
Comparing (15) and (16), we conclude that N ? = ? (17) and N ( + ? ? ) = 1 ? ? :
(18) From the equation (17), we conclude that = 1 N :
From the equation (18), we conclude that 
and nally, subtracting the two fractions in (22), we get the desired result. 6. We have shown that the formula (8) holds for all intervals with rational endpoints. Since the transformation T is continuous (property 7), and since every interval can be represented as a limit of intervals with rational endpoints, we can conclude, by tending to a limit, that this formula is true for all intervals. The theorem is proven. The formula is proven.
